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PoULINt

THE topic of the 1989 Villanova Law Review Symposium is
RICO: Something for Everyone. RICO, of course, is the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.' RICO is a
statute with something for everyone, but not always something
appealing for everyone. For the courts, RICO offers the challenge of statutory interpretation. For criminal prosecutors and
the civil plaintiffs' bar, RICO offers exciting new litigation opportunities. For the defense bars

-

both civil and criminal

-

RICO

offers tremendous headaches. For those who violate the law,
RICO offers new and more serious penalties.
RICO is barely twenty years old. It was enacted in 1970. No
great fanfare attended its enactment. It drew little attention, but
as lawyers discovered RICO and began to explore its possibilities,
there were a number of surprises. One of my colleagues at Villanova recounted to me his initial exposure to RICO, when the statute was fairly new on the scene. He was invited to preside at a
mock trial. The trial, as it turned out, was a mock RICO prosecution. The instructor of the trial course provided the guest judge,
my colleague, with appropriate jury instructions to be delivered
to the jury of high school students. As he read the instructions to
the jury, my colleague found himself pausing at the end of each
paragraph to say to himself, "This can't be the law." A number of
courts responded to RICO with the same incredulity. But, it is
the law.
What is so remarkable about this statute? The impetus of the
t Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 1969, Radcliffe College; J.D., 1973, University of Maine; LL.M., 1975, University of
Michigan.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
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statute, reflected in its legislative history, was to arm prosecutors
with more effective weapons to battle organized crime. The new
weapons RICO created for that battle are indeed potent. The
statute, however, was not written in restrictive terms and, therefore, has not been confined to the battle against organized crime.
Because the statutory language is broad, those weapons may be
employed in civil as well as criminal cases and may be aimed at a
wide range of criminal conduct.
Let us look at three key aspects of RICO that reflect its potency in criminal prosecutions. First, RICO contains broad forfeiture provisions. 2 The government can seek not only
imprisonment and fines, but also forfeiture of property associated
in particular ways with the RICO violation. 3 The government can
freeze assets before trial to ensure that forfeiture will be an effective remedy if the defendant is convicted. Among the assets that
can be frozen and forfeited under RICO are attorney's fees. In
her paper, Professor Brickey addresses the forfeiture provisions
of the statute. She cites a number of examples of forfeiture that
illustrate the harsh impact of the statute when it is applied
broadly. After examining possible arguments for limiting the extent of RICO forfeiture, Professor Brickey concludes that there is
nothing in the language or history of the statute that warrants a
restrictive interpretation of the forfeiture provisions and nothing
in the Constitution that prohibits a broad construction of the
statute.
Second, RICO broadens federal criminal jurisdiction. Under
the statute, violations of state law become a basis for federal prosecution. 4 In addition, the statute reaches acts that are part of a
pattern of racketeering which may have begun long before the
last act, which will trigger the statute of limitations. Thus, a
RICO prosecution can rest in part on crimes otherwise barred by
the statute of limitations. 5
Third, the government can introduce in a RICO prosecution
evidence that would be inadmissible in most cases. The breadth
of the RICO charge renders admissible a broad spectrum of evidence of criminal association and other relevant criminal activity.
Louis Pichini, Assistant Attorney in Charge of the Philadelphia
2. Id. § 1963.
3. Id.
4. Id. § 1961.
5. See United States v. Dellacroce, 625 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (E.D.N.Y.
1986); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 578
F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
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Strike Force, spoke at length of the advantages RICO offers for
the prosecutor in an organized crime prosecution. Mr. Pichini
described his experience in the successful RICO prosecution of
Nicodemo Scarfo in United States v. Scarfo. 6 He contrasted the recent Scarfo prosecution with earlier, less successful prosecutions
under other criminal statutes. The structure of the charges under
RICO provided the prosecution with a vehicle for displaying the
criminal organization - the mob - to the jury. The mob was the
centerpiece of the indictment. Because the mob was the RICO
enterprise, it was an essential element of the government's case.
The government had to prove the association in fact. Volumes of
photographs of non-criminal behavior were admitted to establish
the association in fact among mob members. Tapes of conversations concerning the operation of mob activities were admissible
to establish the enterprise. In addition, violations of state law
could be proven in the federal case because they were predicate
acts under RICO. In a traditional criminal prosecution, most of
this evidence would have been excluded by the restrictive rules
governing proof of other acts. Prior prosecutions had presented
mob crimes in a vacuum; under RICO the prosecution was able to
portray them in context, to bring the life of the street into the
courtroom for the jury.
What does this all add up to? For the Scarfo prosecutors, it
added up to an organized crime conviction that was previously
unattainable. But let me give two other illustrations of what
RICO has to offer in criminal cases. The first situation involved a
friend and criminal defense attorney who recently complained of
the impact of RICO on his practice. He had just received a trial
date in a RICO conspiracy case involving white collar crime, not
organized crime, and had just under four months to prepare the
case. The indictment contained 534 counts and ran 584 pages.
The prosecution had 6000 documents and hours and hours of
tape recordings for him to review. The trial would last 4 to 6
months. His client was named in only eleven counts. The lawyer
wondered how his practice would fare and how his client would
bear the financial burden imposed by this criminal prosecution.
He did not like what RICO offered him.
The second illustration of what RICO has to offer is a 1989
case, United States v. Porceili.7 The United States Court of Appeals
6. The denial of the posttrial motions in this case is reported at 711 F.
Supp. 1315 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
7. 865 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 53 (1989).
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for the Second Circuit, affirming the conviction in Porcelli, remarked that the prosecution in the case "pushes [RICO] to its
outer limits." 8 The defendant was a New York businessman. He

had underpaid New York State sales tax on retail gasoline sales.
His underpayment amounted to about four and three quarter million dollars. Under New York law, underpaying the taxes and filing the false returns were not crimes. Under federal law,
however, these acts were violations of the mail fraud statute; 9 the
defendant had mailed his tax returns. The mail fraud violations
represented by the failure to pay the state tax reflected a "pattern
of racketeering" and, therefore, supported a RICO prosecution.
The defendant was convicted, and it became time to tally the penalty. Porcelli was to forfeit four and three quarter million dollars,
the RICO enterprise, and the portions of additional properties
acquired with funds from the enterprise. The enterprise itself
comprised numerous businesses: twelve gas stations, the realty
companies that owned the land on which the stations were located and the parent company that operated a wholesale gas terminal. The forfeited amount, four and three quarter million
dollars, was to be paid to the state and up to twice that amount
was to be paid to the federal government.' 0 In addition, the defendant received a two year sentence. The effect may be exactly
what the drafters of the legislation wanted. It prompts the question: Does crime pay?
The features that RICO brings to criminal litigation are potent tools. Their potential is as yet undefined, although federal

prosecutors now frequently employ RICO. In large part, however, abuses have been avoided and the outer limits of the law
have not been defined because of the Department of Justice policy of restraint."I The government, conscious of the power of the
2
statute, has generally exercised its discretion with care.'
8. Porcelli, 865 F.2d at 1355.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
10. In this way, the court acheived proportionality: the total was equivalent
to treble damages measured by the harm to the victim state.
11. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL Div., RICO: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 127-29 (1988).

12. There are, nevertheless, some examples of prosecutions which push the
statute to its outer reaches. Porcelli is one example and Professor Brickey examines some others in her paper. In addition, there are other reported cases, such
as United States v. Regan, 726 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), in which the results
of the prosection are so drastic that they must be questioned on policy grounds.
Regan, which exemplifies RICO's broad use, involved a tax fraud scheme.
Princeton/Newport Partners, an investment partnership with close ties to others
implicated in the Wall Street insider-trading scandal, and Drexel Burnham Lam-
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RICO also offers powerful new tools in civil litigation. To an
unusual extent, the statutory provisions governing civil claims
track the criminal provisions. In the civil arena, however, unlike
the criminal, there is no restraining influence to avoid abuses.
Civil attorneys did not discover RICO immediately. Now it has

become an important focus in many types of civil litigation. Edward Mannino, Esq., speaking at the symposium, commented that
it may now be malpractice not to include a RICO count in a civil
complaint in commercial litigation. The civil provisions of the
statute have all the breadth of the criminal statute; the provisions
are parallel. RICO gives plaintiffs' attorneys the opportunity to
use the theories that provide for far-reaching criminal prosecution. The statute entices lawyers to use those provisions. The
financial incentive is substantial - treble damages and attorneys
fees.
RICO's impact on civil litigation has been substantial. RICO
provides many ordinary civil cases with an entree to federal court.
Almost one thousand civil RICO cases were filed in federal courts
in 1988. RICO also provides a broad right of action in state
court; the Supreme Court recently held that a state court may as13
sert jurisdiction over a claim under the federal RICO statute.
Civil applications of RICO have been unrestrained, extensive and
imaginative.
In his paper, Mr. Mannino discusses the use of civil RICO
against financial institutions. He examines a number of the creative arguments that have been used - not always with success to fit the conduct and structure of banks into the statutory requirements of RICO. Even when those arguments do not prevail,
bert, Inc. were indicted for RICO violations. Allegations included a tax scheme
in which false long-term capital gains were created through rigged transactions,
resulting in a tax write-off of $13 million in false tax losses. Princeton/Newport
was eventually forced to liquidate due to the impending threat of severe RICO
penalties and forfeiture provisions. This case marked the first time officials of
securities firms had been charged with violations of RICO. Wall St. J., Aug. 5,
1988, § 1, at 3, col. 2.
An extremely critical view of RICO was expressed by FredJoseph, company
chief of Drexel Burnham Lambert, a company precipitated into bankruptcy by
the combination of forfeiture and fines, among other factors. He stated:
The federal racketeering law, as applied to financial institutions, is a
devastating nuclear bomb. The penalties we paid ended up doing material long-term damage to the firm, costing 11,000 people their jobs
and costing the markets what most people will admit was a creative,
innovative force for financing companies. All this because of alleged
wrongdoing by a handful of people. It just seems unfair.
Behar, We Grew Quickly and We Stepped On Toes, TIME, April 23, 1990, at 62.
13. Tafflin v. Levitt, 109 S. Ct. 2428, reh'gdenied, 110 S. Ct. 401 (1989).
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the suits relying on such arguments force the banks to at least
incur the expenses of their defense and force the courts to engage
in the process of legislative interpretation.
RICO has been employed with mixed success in civil suits
against other types of defendants whose motivation was not criminal gain. For example, union action that becomes overly assertive
may provide the basis for a RICO suit. In Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 14a strike against the
bus company allegedly led to threats of property damage and
bodily harm which then constituted the predicate acts in a RICO
complaint. Similarly, in Domestic Linen Supply & Laundry v. Central

States,t 5 the union's excessively forceful effort to persuade the employer to include supervisors in the bargaining unit and pay into
the pension fund on their behalf provided the basis for a civil
RICO action by the employer against the union. Both cases
raised difficult legal issues. In Yellow Bus Lines, the question was
one of union liability for the threatening and violent conduct of
union members. In Domestic Linen, the question was whether the
union had crossed the line between activity protected by the National Labor Relations Act and activity prohibited by federal criminal law. In each of these cases, the offended employer was able
to bring the union before the federal district court with the threat
of treble damages and attorney's fees, as well as damnation with
the rubric "racketeer." In Yellow Bus Lines, the trial court dismissed the RICO counts and the employer's appeal ultimately
failed. In Domestic Linen, the employer overcame the union's motion to dismiss at the trial level.
Even more striking creativity of application was displayed in
Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle.' 6 The plaintiff, a wo-

men's health center, brought a civil RICO action against antiabortion protesters who had repeatedly and destructively trespassed into the clinic. The plaintiff prevailed on the RICO claim,
although the amount of damages attributed to the RICO violation
was minimal. As Professor G. Robert Blakey contended in the
defendants' unsuccessful petition for a writ of certiorari, this type
of suit takes RICO far from its originally intended role as a
weapon aimed at the conduct of organized crime.1 7 The defend14.
15.
16.
17.
for the
Center,

No. 86-5136 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 1990) (1990 WL 126317).
722 F. Supp. 1472 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (!989).
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
Third Circuit at 10-11, 14, 20, McMonagle v. Northeast Women's
Inc., 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989) (No. 88-2137).
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ants were not acting for profit. Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the conduct fell within the ambit of the broadly drafted RICO
statute. The United States Supreme Court declined to review
that determination. Whether such application pushes the statute
beyond the tolerance of Congress remains to be seen.
A problem confronting those attempting to define the scope
of civil RICO is that its intended role is far from clear.' In his
paper, Professor Lynch examines one aspect of civil RICO's function. Professor Lynch considers whether the civil RICO suits augment the criminal enforcement goal of the statute in some useful
way. He examines the assumptions underlying the arguments for
and against the utility of RICO as a vehicle for private prosecutions and concludes that, overall, the civil provisions effect more
harm than good in this capacity.
Some responses have been less tempered. The expansive
use of RICO has roused ire in some. ChiefJustice Rehnquist was
so exercised by the torrent of RICO litigation that he publicly
pleaded: "Get RICO Cases Out of My Courtroom.' 9 The Chief
Justice is not alone in his negative reaction. 20 When Congress
held hearings on proposed amendments to RICO in 1985, witness after witness condemned the expansive application of civil
RICO. 2 ' Nevertheless, Congress did not restrict civil application
of the statute. Congress responded, apparently, either to the in18. The intent of RICO is hard to determine given the statute's broad language. The unintended evolution of RICO into something quite different from
its original intent occurred because of RICO's broad language. The statute was
written broadly so that federal authorities would have broad discretion to attack
organized crime. Federal government authorities can exercise this discretion;
however, private attorneys must bring all actions that serve their clients interests. See 132 CONG. REc. E3530, E3531 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1986) (statement of
Rep. Boucher).
19. Rehnquist, Get RICO Cases Out of My Courtroom, Wall St.J., May 19, 1989,
at A14, col. 4.
20. See, e.g., Stop Misuse of RICO, Los Angeles Daily J., July 18, 1989, at 6,
col. 1; RICO, What a Racket, Los Angeles Daily J., Aug. 29, 1988, at 4, col. 1.
21. Stephen M. Shapiro, Esq. testified that the lack of restraint on civil
RICO litigation poses serious adverse effects "not only for the individual companies that are named as defendants but for our entire court system and for our
economy." RICO Reform Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 2517, 2943, 4892, 5290,
5391, 5445 Before the Subcommittee on CriminalJustice of the Committee on theJudiciary,
House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., at 839 (1985-86) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Stephen M. Shapiro, Esq., on behalf of the New York
Clearing House Association).
In addition, the threat of civil RICO penalties leads to extortive settlements
since it exposes the business to treble damages. Id. at 840. RICO escalates the
cost of litigation through immense discovery procedures which tend to force
businessmen to dispose of a case at exorbitant settlement amounts rather than
be harassed and endure discovery. Id. at 841. The number of civil RICO cases
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ertia generated by the statute which proved to be an effective
prosecutor's tool against organized crime, or to the witnesses
who pleaded on behalf of the civil application of the statute.
Because RICO has surprised many with its broad application,
one might ask, "Is it really the law?" The answer is, "Yes." A
number of lower courts sought avenues to limit RICO, but the
Supreme Court has refused to narrow it to any significant degree. 22 The Court has merely invited Congress to act. The Court
expressed its position in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,23 when it
stated: "It is true that private civil actions under the statute are
being brought almost solely against such defendants [legitimate
businesses], rather than the archetypical, intimidating mobster.
Yet this defect - if defect it is - is inherent in the statute as
written, and its correction must lie with Congress. ' 24 Yet, despite
the complaint presented in Sedima and many other complaints
that Congress never intended RICO to function as it has, Congress has not intervened. Congress has let most proposed
amendments die.2 5 The action Congress has taken has strengthbeing filed has increased 600% in the last three years and is predicted to continue to rise and flood the court system. Id. at 842.
In addition, only a minority of civil RICO cases have been brought against
racketeering activities; the majority are mere commercial disputes which should
be decided under contract law or federal securities laws. Id. at 852 (statement of
New York Clearing House Association, delivered by Stephen M. Shapiro and
Richard A. Salomon).

Newton N. Minow was also highly critical of the broad application of civil

RICO. "Defendants who wish to fight RICO claims asserted against them must
endure costly and protracted litigation and the tremendous risk of a treble damage award, both while facing damaging accusations of racketeering activity.

Ironically and sadly, the civil provisions of RICO have had virtually no effect on

what was Congress' purpose, which was the eradication of organized crime." Id.
at 153 (testimony of Newton N. Minow accompanied by James Dyke and Robert
D. McLean, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, IL).
22. Taftin v. Levitt, 109 S.Ct. 2428 (1989) (holding that state courts may
assert jurisdiction over RICO claims; language of statute did not state otherwise); HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989); Fort

Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); see also, United States v. Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. 2657
(1989) (interpreting similar forfeiture statute to permit forfeiture of attorneys'

fees); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2646 (1989)
(rejecting constitutional challenge to use of similar statute to forfeit attorneys'
fees).
23. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
24. Id. at 499-500.
25. See, e.g., H.R. 4920, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (proposed to amend
RICO to restructure civil claims procedures); H.R. 4923, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988) (proposed to add predicate acts similar to those proposed in H.R. 4892,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)); H.R. 2983, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (proposed to restrict inappropriate use of federal racketeering laws in private litigation, while retaining carefully crafted multiple damage consumer fraud remedy
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ened the statute. Predicate acts have been added 2 6 and the forfeiture provisions have been enhanced to make them more effective
tools. 2 7

The Congressional foot is not yet approaching the brake
pedal. Three bills have been presented to the 101st Congress.
All are modest. If enacted, the bills would clarify and narrow
some applications of RICO, but none would effect major changes.
To a large extent, the pending bills advance proposals that have
been presented to Congress in past sessions and have failed to
28
become law.

H.R. 3522 proposes only that nonviolent protest be exand basing RICO civil conviction upon prior criminal conviction); H.R. 4892,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (proposed arbitration settlement for claims arising
under section 1964(c) of title 18 and based upon fraudulent activity; also proposed additional predicate acts including prostitution involving minors, homicide, obstruction of justice, sexual exploitation of children, destruction of
aircraft or aircraft facilities, assaults against federal officer's family, bank bribery,
solicitation to commit a crime of violence, fraud on treasury paper, forgery of
state and other securities, fraud with computers, and hostage taking); S. 2907,
99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S15823 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (proposed
rewording "racketeer" to avoid negative connotation and prevent unnecessary
harm to individual's reputation by using "illicit" instead); S. 2021, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S335 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1986) (proposed to improve
protection of children from sexual exploitation by adding predicate act and increasing punishment provisions for sexual exploitation offenses)).
26. See Victim and Witness Related Amendments, Pub. L. No. 99-646,
§ 50(a), 100 Stat. 3605 (1986) (added predicate acts relating to tampering with
witness, victim or informant, acts relating to retaliating against witness, victim or
informant in obstruction of state or local law enforcement); Predicate Offenses,
Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1365(b), 100 Stat. 3207-35 (1986) (added predicate acts
relating to laundering of monetary instruments, engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity, and acts relating to
prohibition of illegal gambling businesses); Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 901(g)(2),
1020(2), 98 Stat. 2135, 2143, 2770 (1984) (added predicate offenses including
any act indictable under Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, acts
relating to obscene matter, and wire fraud); Definition of Racketeering Activity,
Pub. L. No. 98-547, § 205(1), (2), 98 Stat. 2770 (1984) (added predicate offenses
including acts relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle
parts, and acts relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles).
27. See Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 302,
98 Stat. 2040 (1984); Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2301, 98 Stat. 2192 (1984) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1963; added provisions relating to power of court to order forfeiture to United States; added provision stating that defendant who derives
profits or other proceeds from offense may be fined not more than twice gross
profits or other proceeds; substituted provisions relating to transfer of rights in
property to United States, or to other transferees, for provisions relating to
seizure and transfer of property to United States).
28. S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S1652 (daily ed. Feb. 23,
1989) (proposes to add similar predicate offenses as were proposed in H.R.
4892, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) and H.R. 4923, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988)). For a summary of the bills, see supra note 25.
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empted from the coverage of the act.2 9 The proposed amend-

ment is aimed at applications such as that in Northeast Women's
Center, Inc. v. McMonagle and to some degree those in the union
cases discussed above. If enacted, H.R. 3522 would be more symbolic than effective. In each of those cases that appear to have
prompted the legislative proposal, the plaintiffs alleged violence
on the part of the defendants, so the suit would be unaffected by
the proposed amendment. In addition, the first amendment's
protection of free speech prohibits penalizing nonviolent protest
as a matter of constitutional law. Thus, even if enacted, the proposal is likely to have little impact.
H.R. 1046 and S. 438 are more ambitious proposals. Like
earlier amendments, both include lists of predicate offenses to be
added to section 1961.30 In addition, H.R. 1046 and S. 438 in-

clude other, more significant aspects. Both proposed amendments would limit access to treble damages. Plaintiffs whose
claims rest on commercial or financial injury would be able to recover treble damages and costs only if the offenses fell in specific
defined categories and were shown by clear and convincing evidence to have been "consciously malicious, or so egregious and
deliberate that malice may be implied." 31 This proposal responds
to the proliferation of RICO complaints in what appear to be
otherwise routine civil actions. By increasing the burden of
proof, the proposal seeks to remove the major incentives that
have encouraged the flood of civil RICO suits.
Interestingly, however, the legislative proposals continue to
suggest a scheme that attaches significance to conviction. If the
defendant has been convicted of the conduct, the plaintiff would
be relieved of the additional burden. This aspect of the proposals
is an offspring of earlier proposals to condition the civil action on
the criminal conviction, which were introduced in response to
Sedima and have never commanded a majority vote.32 The current
proposals represent a more modest attempt to temper civil use of
29. H.R. 3522, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
30. See H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989); S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S1652 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989); see also S. 774, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S6907 (daily ed. June 19, 1989) (proposes to
make several financial institution crimes predicate offenses for violation of
RICO; such crimes include receipt of commissions or gifts for approving loans,
financial institution misapplication and embezzlement, fraud and false statements, and financial institution fraud).
31. H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989).
32. See H.R. 2983, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 5445, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986).
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the cause of action by the normally responsible exercise of
prosecutorial discretion and the operation of the criminal justice
system. Rather than conditioning civil access on conviction, the
proposed provision would merely give a boost to civil suits
brought after conviction. This approach is preferable to earlier
proposals that would have permitted a civil RICO action only if
the defendant had been convicted of the predicate act. 3" The current proposal does not condition the availability of a civil action
on prosecutorial decisions about who to prosecute and what plea
bargains to strike.3 4 It may prove a useful way to slow down the
machine of civil RICO.
The pending legislation also continues efforts to free civil
targets of RICO from the damning epithet "racketeer" in civil
cases which do not involve crimes of violence. 3 5 Many have decried the unfairness of inflicting damage by labelling a defendant
a racketeer or a member of organized crime when the case involves a commercial or financial fraud, and has no connection
with organized crime. 36 The proposed legislation addresses that
complaint by putting such terms off limits in all aspects of civil
cases in which the complaint does not allege a crime of violence
and designates as crimes of violence those activities which are
more traditionally associated with syndicated crime and
terrorism.
The pending legislation also provides that good faith reliance
on a ruling or legal provision would be an affirmative defense to a
RICO action under section 1964. This provision would benefit
33. According to testimony of Ronald Goldstock, Director, New York State
Organized Crime Task Force, it is unfair to condition a civil RICO conviction
upon a prior criminal conviction since a criminal case may be lost due to an
illegal search or other procedural technicality and through no fault of the victim.
The victim's right to a civil case should also not depend upon the prosecutor's
willingness to appeal or plea bargain. In addition, due to the guarantees of the
fifth amendment, a defendant may not be called to the witness stand in a criminal case and, therefore, testimony which would be revealed in a civil case to
prove the predicate acts is lost in a criminal case. Hearings, supra note 21, at
1340-41 (testimony of Ronald Goldstock, Director, New York State Organized
Crime Task Force).
34. See H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989); S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S1652 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989).
35. See supra note 34; see also S. 2907, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 132 CONG. REc.
S15823 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986); H.R. 5290, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
36. One of the complaints which the business community voices against
civil RICO's broad use is that "RICO's 'racketeer' label, particularly along with
the threat of treble damages, leads legitimate businesses to settle 'garden variety' fraud claims for 'extortionate' amounts." 133 CONG. REC. E3351, E3352
(daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., of Michigan).
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defendants such as the union defendant in Domestic Linen, which
claimed to have limited its conduct to organizing activity protected by the NLRA. This proposed provision may also be intended to protect protester defendants like those sued in Northeast
Women's Center; they could claim a good faith belief that their behavior was protected by the first amendment. Its protection is
limited, however. If the defendant can point to a ruling or legal
provision that arguably supported the conduct alleged to have violated RICO, the defendant still must go to trial and put the affirmative defense before the jury. The defendant must incur the
cost of litigation and run the risk of failing to persuade the jury
before gaining the benefit of the proposed protection. Again, the
legislators are looking for a way to temper what they see as the
worst abuses of RICO without diminishing its core impact.
As was remarked throughout the symposium, RICO is identified as a statute aimed at organized crime, and no legislator wants
to advocate narrowing the statute and risk being labelled a procrime legislator. For that reason, it is difficult to amend the statute to narrow it significantly. The current legislative proposals
reflect that fact. None strikes at the criminal application of the
statute. None would restrict the prosecutor's broad discretion to
apply RICO aggressively and creatively. Further, although the
proposals would alter the face of civil RICO litigation, none
would disable the civil bar from employing RICO in creative and
lucrative ways. RICO may be "very possibly the single worst
piece of legislation on the book," 3 7 but it is the law.
37. Rehnquist, supra note 19.
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